In this issue, the California Law Review presents an exchange of views on the problem of evaluation and legal thought. Professor Rubin's Article opens the discussion by suggesting that the absence of an evaluative theory has had unfortunate consequences for the development of legal scholarship. Professor Rubin contends the lack of agreed-upon criteria for considering scholarship has stunted debate over substantive issues and encouraged the use of unexamined intuition as a basis for judgment. In formulating an evaluative theory to resolve this deficiency, Professor Rubin applies the epistemological approach of several modern continental philosophers-Habermas, Gadamer, Heidegger, and Husserl. The Article recommends that scholarship be judged using the criteria of clarity, persuasiveness, significance, and applicability. Professor Rubin also suggests that evaluators consider the doubt and anxiety they feel when confronting a work from a subdiscipline that is different from their own. The Article is followed by Professor Schlag's response.
CITATION STYLE
Rubin, E. L. (1992). On beyond Truth: A Theory for Evaluating Legal Scholarship. California Law Review, 80(4), 889. https://doi.org/10.2307/3480700
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