Bizarre beliefs and rational choices: A behavioral approach to analytic narratives

  • Schiemann J
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Abstract

Rational choice analytic narratives claim to take seriously the way real actors form their beliefs. I argue that a commonly applied formal technique perfect Bayesian equilibrium inadequately accounts for realistic beliefs, unnecessarily impoverishing analytic narratives. I propose an equilibrium concept drawn from cognitive psychology support theory equilibrium that provides an accurate account of beliefs within a formal analytic narrative approach. I ground both the critique and the alternative in a discussion of ethnic mobilization in Yugoslavia. The result is a behaviorally informed analytic narrative that offers a more accurate account of the role of real including bizarre beliefs in strategic interaction.

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Authors

  • John W. Schiemann

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