Boards of directors and firm-performance: integrating agency and resource dependence perspectives

  • Hillman A
  • Dalziel T
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Abstract

Boards of directors serve two important functions for organizations: monitoring management on behalf of shareholders and providing resources. Agency theorists assert that effective monitoring is a function of a board's incentives, whereas resource dependence theorists contend that the provision of resources is a function of board capital. We combine the two perspectives and argue that board capital affects both board monitoring and the provision of resources and that board incentives moderate these relationships. ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR Copyright of Academy of Management Review is the property of Academy of Management and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts) Boards of directors serve two important functions for organizations: monitoring management on behalf of shareholders and providing resources. Agency theorists assert that effective monitoring is a function of a board's incentives, whereas resource dependence theorists contend that the provision of resources is a function of board capital. We combine the two perspectives and argue that board capital affects both board monitoring and the provision of resources and that board incentives moderate these relationships. ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR Copyright of Academy of Management Review is the property of Academy of Management and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts)

Author-supplied keywords

  • AGENCY theory
  • BOARDS of directors
  • CORPORATE governance
  • DIRECTORS of corporations
  • INDUSTRIAL management
  • MANAGEMENT
  • ORGANIZATIONAL sociology
  • ORGANIZATIONAL structure
  • RESOURCE management
  • STOCKHOLDERS

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Authors

  • Amy I Hillman

  • Thomas Dalziel

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