Burge on perception and the disjunction problem

0Citations
Citations of this article
1Readers
Mendeley users who have this article in their library.

Abstract

According to the Disjunction Problem, teleological theories of perceptual content are unable to explain why it is that a subject represents an F when an F causes the perception and not the disjunction F v G, given that the subject has mistaken G's for F's in the past. Without an adequate explanation these theories are stuck without an account of how non-veridical representation is possible, which would be an unsettling result. In this paper I defend Burge's teleological theory of perception against the Disjunction Problem, arguing that a perceptual state's representing what I call an error-prohibiting disjunctive property is incompatible with the truth of perceptual anti-individualism. And because perceptual anti-individualism is at the heart of Burge's theory, I conclude that Burgeans need not be concerned with the Disjunction Problem.

Cite

CITATION STYLE

APA

Altschul, J. (2015). Burge on perception and the disjunction problem. Theoria (Spain), 30(2), 251–269. https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.11008

Register to see more suggestions

Mendeley helps you to discover research relevant for your work.

Already have an account?

Save time finding and organizing research with Mendeley

Sign up for free