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Journal article

Causal Decision Theory

PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, vol. 1984 (1984) pp. 177-200

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Abstract

After a brief presentation of evidential decision theory, causal decision theory, and Newcomb type prima facie counterexamples to the evidential theory, three kinds of "metatickle" defenses of the evidential theory are discussed. Each has its weaknesses, but one of them seems stronger than the other two. The weaknesses of the best of the three, and the intricacy of metatickle analysis, does not constitute an advantage of causal decision theory over the evidential theory, however. It is argued, by way of an example, that causal decision theory also stands in need of a metatickle defense.

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Authors

  • Ellery Eells

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