Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods

  • Green J
  • Laffont J
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Abstract

Social decision mechanisms that admit dominant strategies and result in Pareto optima are characterized by the class of mechanisms proposed by Groves. The concept of decision mechanisms is generalized and the characterization is shown to extend to these cases.

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Authors

  • Jerry Green

  • Jean-Jacques Laffont

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