Continuous stability and evolutionary convergence

  • Eshel I
  • Motro U
  • Sansone E
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A stochastic process of long-term evolution due to mutation and selection is defined over an asexually reproducing population, with selection according to a population game with a one-dimensional continuity of pure strategies. Limiting the analysis to mutations of small effect, it is shown that long-term dynamic stability in such a process is equivalent to continuous stability in the relevant population game. In the case of a one-dimensional strategy set (but not necessarily if the strategy set is multi-dimensional), this result is virtually independent of the distribution of mutations.

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  • Ilan Eshel

  • Uzi Motro

  • Emilia Sansone

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