Journal article

Corporate Governance , family business complexity and succession

Transfer of Ownership in Private Businesses (2010) pp. 1-20

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Family businesses are more heterogeneous than are corporations listed on the stock exchange and therefore they need specific and well-tailored governance respective of the situation. Based on the complexity theorem of governance in family firms we will discuss optimal governance before and after the transfer of the family firm. As there is an optimal (corporate) governance structure for each individual family business in each point of time on one hand, and taking into consideration that succession changes the distinct qualities of the family business system on the other, a different governance structure is needed past succession. 1

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  • Sabine B Klein

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