Covenants without swords: Group identity, norms, and communication in social dilemmas

  • Bicchieri C
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In one-shot social dilemma experiments, cooperation rates dramatically increase if subjects are allowed to communicate before making a choice. There are two possible explanations for this` communication effect'. One is that communication enhances group identity, the other is that communication elicits social norms. I discuss both views and argue in favor of a norm-based explanation.

Author-supplied keywords

  • Communication
  • Cooperation
  • Group identity
  • Social dilemmas
  • Social norms

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  • Cristina Bicchieri

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