Data attack isolation in power networks using secure voltage magnitude measurements

  • Sou K
  • Sandberg H
  • Johansson K
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Abstract

In this paper a procedure to detect and isolate data attacks on power network power flow measurements is proposed. This method can be used in conjunction with available bad data detection (BDD) methods to isolate multiple bad data which are otherwise difficult to handle. The proposed procedure relies on secure measurements of bus voltage magnitudes to define a measurement residual using potentially compromised active and reactive power flow measurements on transmission lines. The proposed residual can be calculated in real-time. In addition, the component of the proposed residual on any particular line depends only locally on the component of the data attack on the same line. This makes the proposed residual well-suited for distributed data attack isolation in large-scale power networks. Furthermore, it can be shown that the proposed procedure becomes more effective when measurements from multiple time instances can be utilized. A detailed numerical case study on the IEEE 14-bus benchmark system demonstrates the effectiveness of the proposed procedure.

Author-supplied keywords

  • Fault location
  • power network state estimation
  • security
  • wide-area protection

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