An economic model of representative democracy

  • Besley T
  • Coate S
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This paper develops an approach to the study of democratic policy-making
where politicians are selected by the people from those citizens who
present themselves as candidates for public office. The approach has a
number of attractive features. First, it is a conceptualization of a
pure form of representative democracy in which government is by, as well
as of; the people. Second, the model is analytically tractable, being
able to handle multidimensional issue and policy spaces very naturally.
Third, it provides a vehicle for answering normative questions about the
performance of representative democracy.

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  • T Besley

  • S Coate

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