How effective is advice from interested parties?. An experimental test using a pure coordination game

  • Kuang X
  • Weber R
  • Dana J
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Abstract

This study investigates whether the effectiveness of non-binding advice in coordination is influenced by knowledge of the adviser's motive. Using pure coordination games in which a non-playing adviser makes a recommendation of which strategy to play, we find that if the advice appears to be "self-interested" (i.e., the adviser has a monetary stake in the advice being followed), it is less effective than if the same advice is given by a neutral independent party with no economic interest in the game. The implications of our results for the effectiveness of advice in real-world economic and organizational situations are discussed. © 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Author-supplied keywords

  • Advice
  • Coordination games
  • Equilibrium selection

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Authors

  • Xi (Jason) Kuang

  • Roberto A. Weber

  • Jason Dana

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