Electoral Equilibrium under Alternative Voting Institutions

  • Cox G
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This paper investigates the nature of multicandidate electoral equilibria under three different classes of single-ballot-single-winner voting systems: (1) scoring rules (including the plurality rule, Borda's method of marks, and negative voting); (2) Condorcet completion procedures; and (3) multiple voting procedures (including approval voting). Some of the key findings of this paper are that (1) multicandidate equilibria under the plurality rule must be noncentrist; (2) in an election held under any Condorcet procedure, candidates have a dominant strategy to adopt the median voter's position; (3) there is a set of nontrivial voting methods for which equilibria routinely exist regardless of the dimensionality of the policy space; and (4) the plurality rule is alone among commonly discussed voting procedures in not having centrist multicandidate equilibria.

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  • Gary W. Cox

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