Financing decisions as a source of conflict in venture boards

  • Forbes D
  • Korsgaard M
  • Sapienza H
  • 75


    Mendeley users who have this article in their library.
  • 22


    Citations of this article.


Governance scholarship has suggested that venture boards should be structured so as to stimulate internal conflict. However, structure is a weak predictor of board effectiveness. Moreover, conflict can be dysfunctional, especially when it is focused on relationships rather than tasks. We show that venture boards experience more relationship conflict when they make financing decisions that involve devaluation of the venture and that this effect is moderated by whether the CEO is a founder. Our findings should prompt venture governance scholars to reconsider the importance of board structure, the value of board conflict and the behavior of founder- versus non-founder CEOs. © 2009 Elsevier Inc.

Author-supplied keywords

  • Boards of directors
  • Conflict
  • Decision making
  • Founders

Get free article suggestions today

Mendeley saves you time finding and organizing research

Sign up here
Already have an account ?Sign in

Find this document


  • Daniel P. Forbes

  • M. Audrey Korsgaard

  • Harry J. Sapienza

Cite this document

Choose a citation style from the tabs below

Save time finding and organizing research with Mendeley

Sign up for free