FPGA implementation and analysis of random delay insertion countermeasure against DPA

  • Lu Y
  • O'Neill M
  • McCanny J
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Security devices can reveal critical information about the cryptographic key from the power consumption of their circuits. Differential power analysis {(DPA)} is one of the most effective power analysis techniques. In recent years numerous countermeasures against the {DPA} attack of hardware implementations of security algorithms have been proposed. In this paper, we investigate the random delay insertion {(RDI)} countermeasure. Previous research has evaluated {RDI} for microprocessor implementations; however, its security properties in relation to hardware implementations have not been investigated in detail. We prove both theoretically and practically that it is an effective technique on {FPGA} devices and we propose a set of critical parameters that can be utilized to optimize a security algorithm design with {RDI} in terms of area, speed and power. In this work, we implement the first hardware security architecture with {RDI} on an {FPGA} device, and attack it using {DPA.} It is shown that {RDI} is an efficient countermeasure technique on {FPGA} in comparison to other countermeasures.

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  • Yingxi Lu

  • Maire P. O'Neill

  • John V. McCanny

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