When does the game end? Public goods experiments with non-definite and non-commonly known time horizons

  • González L
  • Güth W
  • Levati M
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In repeated public goods experiments, ruling out information about an exact, commonly known, and symmetric terminal period does not alter average contributions significantly, although asymmetric information about the time horizon reduces the frequency of end-game effects. © 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Author-supplied keywords

  • Asymmetric information
  • End-game effect
  • Public goods experiment

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