This paper continues the examination of the validity of game-theoretic explanations in empirical social science and policy research. Assuming that real actors with bounded rationality would be unable to cope with the explosive complexity of n-person games, discussion focuses on the conditions under which corporate actors and coalitions, as well as collective and even aggregate actors, may be legitimately treated as unitary players. In addition, the importance of functional differentiation and ingroup-outgroup segmentation for the segregation of game-like interactions is explored. © 1991, Sage Publications. All rights reserved.
CITATION STYLE
Scharpf, F. W. (1991). Games real actors could play: The challenge of complexity. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 3(3), 277–304. https://doi.org/10.1177/0951692891003003003
Mendeley helps you to discover research relevant for your work.