Impossible differential attack on seven-round AES-128

  • Bahrak B
  • Aref M
  • 28


    Mendeley users who have this article in their library.
  • 36


    Citations of this article.


A specific class of differential cryptanalytic approach, named as impossible differential attack, has been successfully applied to several symmetric cryptographic primitives in particular encryption schemes such as Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). Such attacks exploit differences that are impossible at some intermediate state of the cipher algorithm. The best-known impossible differential attack against AES-128 has applied to six rounds. An attack on AES-128 up to seven rounds is proposed. The proposed attack requires 2115.5 chosen plaintexts and 2109 bytes of memory and performs 2119 seven-round AES encryptions. This is also the best-known attack on a reduced version of the AES-128 till now.

Get free article suggestions today

Mendeley saves you time finding and organizing research

Sign up here
Already have an account ?Sign in

Find this document


  • B. Bahrak

  • M.R. Aref

Cite this document

Choose a citation style from the tabs below

Save time finding and organizing research with Mendeley

Sign up for free