Does Linguistic Communication Rest on Inference?

  • Recanati F
  • 71

    Readers

    Mendeley users who have this article in their library.
  • 58

    Citations

    Citations of this article.

Abstract

It is often claimed that, because of semantic underdetermination, one can determine the content of an utterance only by appealing to pragmatic considerations concerning what the speaker means, what his intentions are. This supports ‘inferen- tialism’: the view that, in contrast to perceptual content, communicational content is accessed indirectly, via an inference. As against this view, I argue that primary pragmatic processes (the pragmatic processes that are involved in the determination of truth- conditional content) need not involve an inference from premises concerning what the speaker can possibly intend by his utterance. Indeed, they need not involve any infer- ence at all: communication, I argue, is as direct as perception.

Get free article suggestions today

Mendeley saves you time finding and organizing research

Sign up here
Already have an account ?Sign in

Find this document

Authors

  • Francois Recanati

Cite this document

Choose a citation style from the tabs below

Save time finding and organizing research with Mendeley

Sign up for free