We study an evolutionary model where agents are locally matched to play a symmetric coordination game. Opportunities to adjust strategy and location arrive asynchronously and infrequently, and cannot be coordinated. Our results on the short-run co-existence of different conventions and long-run efficiency depend upon a condition on off-equilibrium payoffs introduced by Aumann. In a pure coordination game, efficient and inefficient conventions may co-exist at different locations in the short-run, and inefficient conventions are stochastically stable. In a stag-hunt game, there is neither short-run coexistence nor long-run inefficiency. © 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
CITATION STYLE
Bhaskar, V., & Vega-Redondo, F. (2004). Migration and the evolution of conventions. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 55(3), 397–418. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2002.03.001
Mendeley helps you to discover research relevant for your work.