Mixed Bundling in Two-Sided Markets in the Presence of Installed Base Effects

  • Chao Y
  • Derdenger T
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We analyze mixed bundling in two-sided markets where installed base effects are present and find that the pricing structure deviates from traditional bundling as well as the standard two-sided markets literature - we determine prices on both sides fall with bundling. Mixed bundling acts as a price discrimination tool segmenting the market more efficiently. Consequently, as a by-product of this price discrimination, the two sides are better coordinated and social welfare is enhanced. We show unambiguously that platform participations increase on both sides of the market. After theoretically evaluating the impact mixed bundling has on prices and welfare, we take the model predictions to data from the portable video game console market. We find empirical support for all theoretical predictions.

Author-supplied keywords

  • D42
  • L12
  • L4
  • L86
  • Mixed Bundling
  • Portable Video Game Industry
  • Price Discrimination
  • Two-Sided Markets

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  • Yong Chao

  • Timothy Derdenger

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