Models and the Semantic View

  • Thomson‐Jones M
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Abstract

I begin by distinguishing two notions of model, the notion of a truth-making structure and the notion of a mathematical model ( in one specific sense). I then argue that although the models of the semantic view have often been taken to be both truth-making structures and mathematical models, this is in part due to a failure to distinguish between two ways of truth-making; in fact, the talk of truth-making is best excised from the view altogether. The result is a version of the semantic view which is better supported by the direct evidence offered for it, better equipped to achieve its avowed aims, and, I think, closer to the intentions of the original proponents of the view in many ways, despite some of their own declarations to the contrary.

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Authors

  • Martin Thomson‐Jones

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