THE MYTH OF CARTESIAN QUALIA

  • DE ROSA R
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Abstract

The standard view of Cartesian sensations (SV) is that they present themselves as purely qualitative features of experience (or qualia). Accordingly, Descartes’ view would be that in perceiving the color red, for example, we are merely experiencing the subjective feel of redness rather than seeming to perceive a property of bodies. In this paper, I establish that the argument and textual evidence offered in support of SV fail to prove that Descartes held this view. Indeed, I will argue that there are textual and theoretical reasons for believing that Descartes held the negation of SV. Qualia aren’t Descartes’ legacy. To claim that Cartesian sensations are qualia is

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Authors

  • RAFFAELLA DE ROSA

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