Acknowledgments\txiIntroductionWalter Sinnott-Armstrong\txiii1\tThe Cognitive Neuroscience of Moral EmotionsJorge Moll, Ricardo de Oliveira-Souza, Roland Zahn and Jordan Grafman\t11.1\tProcesses and Moral EmotionsWilliam D. Casebeer\t191.2\tMorality, Inhibition, and Propositional ContentCatherine A. Hynes\t251.3\tResponse to Casebeer and HynesJorge Moll, Mirella L. M. F. Paiva, Roland Zahn and Jordan Grafman\t312\tThe Secret Joke of Kant's SoulJoshua D. Greene\t352.1\tMoral Cognition and Computational TheoryJohn Mikhail\t812.2\tToward a Sentimentalist DeontologyMark Timmons\t932.3\tReply to Mikhail and TimmonsJoshua D. Greene\t1053\tWithout MoralsThe Cognitive Neuroscience of Criminal PsychopathsKent A. Kiel\t1193.1\tThe Antisocials Amid UsRicardo de Oliveira-Souza, F{á}tima Azavedo Ign{á}cio and Jorge Moll\t1513.2\tImpaired Moral Reasoning in Psychopaths?Response to Kent KiehlJana Schaich Borg\t1593.3\tA Reply to de Oliveira-Souza, Ign{á}cio and Moll, and Schaich BorgKent A. Kiehl\t1654\tInternalism and the Evidence from Psychopaths and "Acquired Sociopaths"Jeanette Kennett and Cordelia Fine\t1734.1\tInternalism and the Evidence from PathologyAdina L. Roskies\t1914.2\tThe Truth about InternalismMichael Smith\t2074.3\tCould There Be an Empirical Test for Internalism?Jeanette Kennett and Cordelia Fine\t2175\tVarieties of Moral AgencyLessons from Autism (and Psychopathy)Victoria McGeer\t2275.1\tReasons, Reverence, and ValueJeanette Kennett\t2595.2\tThe Will to ConformHeidi Maibom\t2655.3\tAutism, Morality, and EmpathyFr{é}d{é}rique de Vignemont and Uta Frith\t2735.4\tThe Makings of a Moral SensibilityReplies to CommentariesVictoria McGeer\t2816\tMorality and Its DevelopmentJerome Kagan\t2976.1\tMorality, Culture, and the BrainWhat Changes and What Stays the SameNathan A. Fox and Melanie Killen\t3136.2\tThe Fabric of Our Moral LivesA Comment on KaganPaul J. Whalen\t3176.3\tReply to Fox and Killen and WhalenJerome Kagan\t3217\tAdolescent Moral ReasoningThe Integration of Emotion and CognitionAbigail A. Baird\t3237.1\tIntegrative Mechanisms and Implicit Moral Reasoning in AdolescenceAssisted by Daniel K. Lapsley\t3437.2\tCan Baird's View of Adolescent Morality Inform Adolescent Criminal Justice Policy?Katrina L. Sifferd\t3517.3\tReply to Sifferd and LapsleyAbigail A. Baird\t3618\tWhat Neuroscience Can (and Cannot) Contribute to MetaethicsRichard Joyce\t3718.1\tMoral Rationalism and Empirical ImmunityShaun Nichols\t3958.2\tHedonic Reasons as Ultimately Justifying and the Relevance of NeuroscienceLeonard D. Katz\t4098.3\tResponse to Nichols and KatzRichard Joyce\t419References\t427Contributors\t483Index to Volume 1\t485Index to Volume 2\t513Index to Volume 3\t543
CITATION STYLE
Baird, A. A. (2008). The neuroscience of morality: Emotion, brain disorders, and development. In W. Sinnott-Armstrong (Ed.), Moral Psychology, Volume 3 (Vol. 3, pp. 323–370).
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