A new solution to the collective action problem: The paradox of voter turnout

Abstract

Macy's work offers a potential solution to the paradox of voter turnout. The stochastic learning theory of voter turnout (Kanazawa 1998) posits that citizens perceive a correlation between their behavior (voting versus abstention) and the outcome of collective action (win versus loss for their candidate), and that they interpret the outcome as a reinforcer or a punisher. The theory can solve the paradox of voter turnout because now p, the probability that one's vote is or appears decisive, equals approximately .500 in the calculus-of-voting model (instead of p κ 0). I use General Social Survey data to test the theory. The empirical results indicate that citizens make their turnout decisions according to the 'Win-Stay, Lose-Shift' pattern predicted by the stochastic learning theory, especially if there are no strong third-party candidates.