There seems to be an increasing disconnection between the expectations of directors and those of investors as to appropriate levels of executive remuneration. This article seeks to understand why this may be occurring. It starts from the basic principles that drive executive pay, tax, time-scales and trust, and then explores how those factors play out in the imperfect market for talent. As US pay structures are increasingly leading the pay schemes of global companies, it asks whether those structures truly act to enhance shareholder value. It is not at all clear that this is the case, and the article points out that it is unfortunate for US tax and accounting structures to be driving pay elsewhere in the world in directions that are not conducive to shareholder value. The article proposes alternative ways forward.
CITATION STYLE
Lee, P. (2002). Not badly paid but paid badly. Corporate Governance: An International Review. Blackwell Publishing Ltd. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8683.00270
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