Not badly paid but paid badly

  • Lee P
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Abstract

There seems to be an increasing disconnection between the expectations of directors and those of investors as to appropriate levels of executive remuneration. This article seeks to understand why this may be occurring. It starts from the basic principles that drive executive pay, tax, time-scales and trust, and then explores how those factors play out in the imperfect market for talent. As US pay structures are increasingly leading the pay schemes of global companies, it asks whether those structures truly act to enhance shareholder value. It is not at all clear that this is the case, and the article points out that it is unfortunate for US tax and accounting structures to be driving pay elsewhere in the world in directions that are not conducive to shareholder value. The article proposes alternative ways forward. ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR Copyright of Corporate Governance: An International Review is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Author-supplied keywords

  • Accounting for options
  • Corporate governance
  • Executive remuneration
  • Performance hurdles
  • Performance pay
  • Remuneration committee
  • Repricing options
  • Share options
  • Shareholder voting rights

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Authors

  • Paul Lee

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