Promises or policies? an experimental analysis of international agreements and audience reactions

  • Chaudoin S
  • 61

    Readers

    Mendeley users who have this article in their library.
  • 23

    Citations

    Citations of this article.

Abstract

A key assumption of audience costs theories of crisis bargaining and international cooperation is that audience members have strong preferences for consistency between their leader's commitments and actual policy choices. However, audiences also have strong preferences over the policy choices themselves, regardless of their consistency with past commitments. I conducted a randomized survey experiment to evaluate the magnitude of consistency and policy effects in the context of international agreements over trade policy. Respondents with expressed policy preferences, whether supporting or opposing free trade, have muted reactions to learning that their leader has broken an agreement. Only respondents with no opinion on trade policy are affected by learning that their leader's policy is inconsistent with prior commitments. This suggests that constituents' underlying preferences limit the degree to which audience costs influence policymakers' calculations.

Get free article suggestions today

Mendeley saves you time finding and organizing research

Sign up here
Already have an account ?Sign in

Find this document

Authors

  • Stephen Chaudoin

Cite this document

Choose a citation style from the tabs below

Save time finding and organizing research with Mendeley

Sign up for free