The Puzzle of Brandeis, Privacy, and Speech

  • Richards N
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Abstract

S and scholarship assume that privacy and free speech are always in conflict, even though each of these traditions can be traced back to writings by Louis D. Brandeis his 1890 Harvard Law Review article The Right to Privacy and his 1927 concurrence in Whitney v. California. How can modern notions of privacy and speech be so fundamentally opposed if Brandeis played a major role in crafting both? And how, if at all, did Brandeis recognize or address these tensions? These questions have been neglected by scholars of First Amendment law, privacy, and Brandeis. In this paper, I argue that the puzzle of Brandeiss views on privacy and speech can be resolved in a surprising and useful way. My basic claim is that Brandeis came to largely abandon the tort theory of privacy he expounded in The Right to Privacy. As a young lawyer, Brandeis conceived of privacy as a tort action protecting emotional injury from newspaper stories that revealed private facts. But Brandeiss ideas evolved over his life. He soon came to believe strongly in a contrary idea he called the duty of publicity. This is the notion that disclosure of most kinds of fraud and wrongdoing are in the public interest; that as he famously put it, sunlight is the best disinfectant. When Brandeis came to think through First Amendment issues after the First World War, tort privacy could no longer consistently fit into his influential theories of civil liberty. But while Brandeis changed his mind about tort privacy, what he replaced it with is even more interesting. In his Olmstead dissent and free speech writings, Brandeis identified a second conception of privacy that I call intellectual privacy. Brandeis reminds us that the generation of new ideas requires a certain measure of privacy to succeed, and that in this way intellectual privacy and free speech are mutually supportive. I conclude by suggesting some contemporary implications of Brandeiss rejection of tort privacy and his linkage of intellectual privacy with free speech.

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  • ISSN: 00422533
  • SCOPUS: 2-s2.0-79952841865
  • PUI: 361468871
  • SGR: 79952841865

Authors

  • Neil M. Richards

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