The Stability of Dynamic Contests with Asymmetric and Endogenous Prizes

  • Schmidt F
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Abstract

The paper develops a simple theoretical framework for analyzing repeated contests. At each stage of the infinitely repeated game, a Tullock contest is played by two players. We consider local stability of the Nash equilibrium with respect to adjustment speed and the level of the prize. The model is extended to an asymmetric valuation of the prize and to the case with an endogenous prize, where the level of the prize is influenced by the investments of the players.

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Authors

  • Frederik Schmidt

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