Strategic behaviour under regulatory benchmarking

  • Jamasb T
  • Nillesen P
  • Pollitt M
  • 41


    Mendeley users who have this article in their library.
  • 42


    Citations of this article.


In order to improve the efficiency of electricity distribution networks, some regulators have adopted incentive regulation schemes that rely on performance benchmarking. Although regulation benchmarking can influence the "regulation game," the subject has received limited attention. This paper discusses how strategic behaviour can result in inefficient behaviour by firms. We then use the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) method with US utility data to examine implications of illustrative cases of strategic behaviour reported by regulators. The results show that gaming can have significant effects on the measured performance and profitability of firms. © 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Author-supplied keywords

  • Benchmarking
  • Electricity
  • Gaming
  • Regulation
  • Strategic behaviour

Get free article suggestions today

Mendeley saves you time finding and organizing research

Sign up here
Already have an account ?Sign in

Find this document


  • Tooraj Jamasb

  • Paul Nillesen

  • Michael Pollitt

Cite this document

Choose a citation style from the tabs below

Save time finding and organizing research with Mendeley

Sign up for free