Theory, Observation and Scientific Realism

  • Azzouni J
  • 6


    Mendeley users who have this article in their library.
  • N/A


    Citations of this article.


A normative constraint on theories about objects which we take to be real is explored: such theories are required to track the properties of the objects which they are theories of. Epistemic views in which observation (and generalizations of it) play a central role, and holist views which see epistemic virtues as applicable only to whole theories, are contrasted in the light of this constraint. It's argued that global-style epistemic virtues can't meet the constraint, although (certain) epistemic views within which observation (and, more generally, thick epistemic access) are centralized do meet it.

Author-supplied keywords

  • 2004
  • realism

Get free article suggestions today

Mendeley saves you time finding and organizing research

Sign up here
Already have an account ?Sign in

Find this document


  • Jody Azzouni

Cite this document

Choose a citation style from the tabs below

Save time finding and organizing research with Mendeley

Sign up for free