Thought as action: inner speech, self-monitoring, and auditory verbal hallucinations

  • Jones S
  • Fernyhough C
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Abstract

Passivity experiences in schizophrenia are thought to be due to a failure in a neurocognitive action self-monitoring system (NASS). Drawing on the assumption that inner speech is a form of action, a recent model of auditory verbal hallucinations (AVHs) has proposed that AVHs can be explained by a failure in the NASS. In this article, we offer an alternative application of the NASS to AVHs, with separate mechanisms creating the emotion of self-as-agent and other-as-agent. We defend the assumption that inner speech can be considered as a form of action, and show how a number of previous criticisms of applying the NASS to AVHs can be refuted. This is achieved in part through taking a Vygotskian developmental perspective on inner speech. It is suggested that more research into the nature and development of inner speech is needed to further our understanding of AVHs.

Author-supplied keywords

  • *Schizophrenic Psychology
  • Ego
  • Hallucinations/*psychology
  • Humans
  • Models, Psychological

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Authors

  • S R Jones

  • C Fernyhough

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