Node compromise poses severe security threats in wireless sensor networks. Unfortunately, existing security designs can address only a small, fixed threshold number of compromised nodes; the security protection completely breaks down when the threshold is exceeded. In this paper, we seek to overcome the threshold limitation and achieve resiliency against an increasing number of compromised nodes. To this end, we propose a novel location-based approach in which the secret keys are bound to geographic locations, and each node stores a few keys based on its own location. The location-binding property constrains the scope for which individual keys can be (mis)used, thus limiting the damages caused by a collection of compromised nodes. We illustrate this approach through the problem of report fabrication attacks, in which the compromised nodes forge non-existent events. We evaluate our design through extensive analysis, implementation and simulations, and demonstrate its graceful performance degradation in the presence of an increasing number of compromised nodes.
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