White-box security notions for symmetric encryption schemes

  • Delerablée C
  • Lepoint T
  • Paillier P
 et al. 
  • 17

    Readers

    Mendeley users who have this article in their library.
  • 12

    Citations

    Citations of this article.

Abstract

White-box cryptography has attracted a growing interest from researchers in the last decade. Several white-box implementations of standard block-ciphers (DES, AES) have been proposed but they have all been broken. On the other hand, neither evidence of existence nor proofs of impossibility have been provided for this particular setting. This might be in part because it is still quite unclear what white-box cryptography really aims to achieve and which security properties are expected from white-box programs in applications. This paper builds a first step towards a practical answer to this question by translating folklore intuitions behind white-box cryptography into concrete security notions. Specifically, we introduce the notion of white-box compiler that turns a symmetric encryption scheme into randomized white-box programs, and we capture several desired security properties such as one-wayness, incompressibility and traceability for white-box programs. We also give concrete examples of white-box compilers that already achieve some of these notions. Overall, our results open new perspectives on the design of white-box programs that securely implement symmetric encryption. © 2014 Springer-Verlag.

Author-supplied keywords

  • Attack models
  • Security games
  • Security notions
  • Traitor tracing
  • White-box cryptography

Get free article suggestions today

Mendeley saves you time finding and organizing research

Sign up here
Already have an account ?Sign in

Find this document

Authors

  • Cécile Delerablée

  • Tancrède Lepoint

  • Pascal Paillier

  • Matthieu Rivain

Cite this document

Choose a citation style from the tabs below

Save time finding and organizing research with Mendeley

Sign up for free