Combating Corruption through Corporate Transparency: Using Enforcement Discretion to Improve Disclosure

  • Hess D
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Abstract

This article builds on the increased attention given to corruption as an issue of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and the increased enforcement of anti-bribery laws in the United States, to consider how enforcement activity can work to improve corporate transparency and support initiatives developed in the field of corporate social responsibility, such as the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI). Although the GRI requires disclosure on anti-corruption matters, currently, few companies are providing disclosure on this issue and those that are disclosing rarely provide useful information to stakeholders. This article shows how recent trends in criminal and civil law enforcement can be modified slightly to provide strong incentives for companies to disclose information required by the GRI or other social reporting standards. The article then shows how the proposal can assist current enforcement practices directly, but also indirectly by supporting CSR initiatives designed to help combat the enabling environment that allows corruption to thrive.

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APA

Hess, D. (2012). Combating Corruption through Corporate Transparency: Using Enforcement Discretion to Improve Disclosure. Minnesota Journal of International Law, 21(1), 42–74.

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