Many emerging democracies across the globe are scrambling to craft new constitutions. The modal constitution being chosen in this most recent wave of democratization is a rather unknown, and under-theorized, type: semi-presidentialism. This article brings semi-presidentialism back to comparative constitutional theory, distinguishing it from presidentialism and parliamentarism, and guarding against its hasty export to new democracies. This article details when, and why, semi-presidentialism can be problematic from the standpoints of democracy, constitutionalism, and the protection of fundamental rights; and the conditions under which it can be supportive of them. After establishing the analytical framework, this article compares developments in two important historical cases of regime change under semi-presidentialism, cases which have also been among the most influential countries for European politics in the twentieth century: the French Fifth Republic and Weimar Germany. The concluding section draws the evidence together. © 2005 Springer Science+Business Media, Inc.
CITATION STYLE
Skach, C. (2005). Constitutional origins of dictatorship and democracy. Constitutional Political Economy, 16(4), 347–368. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-005-4316-x
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