Detecting black-hole attack in mobile ad hoc networks

Abstract

This paper presents a general approach for detecting the black-hole attack in mobile ad hoc networks, which are particularly vulnerable to attacks compared to traditional wired networks due to Its mobility and broadcast In nature. In particular, black-hole attacks can be easily deployed by the adversary. To defend against this attack, we devise a nelghborhood-based method to detect whether there exists a black hole attack and a routing recovery protocol to set up a correct path to the true destination. Our methods have the remarkable advantage that the number of encryption/decryption operations for authentication is much reduced compared to those methods completely relying on cryptography-based authentication, which can save many system resources (e.g., reduce the energy consumption). Through simulation, we evaluate these methods In terms of packet throughput, routing control overhead, detection probability, false positive probability and false negative probability. Simulation results show that our methods can effectively detect black hole attacks In the sense that detection probability In most cases (the probability that one attacker might be detected) Is above 93%. Meanwhile, It does not introduce much routing control overhead. With the routing recovery mechanism, the packet throughput can be Improved by at least 15% and the false positive probability of the detection approach Is very low (less than 1.7%).