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Is the Emotional Dog Wagging its Rational Tail, or Chasing It?

by Cordelia Fine
Philosophical Explorations ()
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Abstract

According to Haidt’s (2001) social intuitionist model (SIM), an individual’s moral judgment normally arises from automatic ‘moral intuitions’. Private moral reasoning—when it occurs—is biased and post hoc, serving to justify the moral judgment determined by the individual’s intuitions. It is argued here, however, that moral reasoning is not inevitably subserviant to moral intuitions in the formation of moral judgments. Social cognitive research shows that moral reasoning may sometimes disrupt the automatic process of judgment formation described by the SIM. Furthermore, it seems that automatic judgments may reflect the ‘automatization’ of judgment goals based on prior moral reasoning. In line with this role for private moral reasoning in judgment formation, it is argued that moral reasoning can, under the right circumstances, be sufficiently unbiased to effectively challenge an individual’s moral beliefs. Thus the social cognitive literature indicates a greater and more direct role for private moral reasoning than the SIM allows.

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