Does mood influence moral judgment? An empirical test with legal and policy implications

Abstract

Recent legal scholarship has seen the rapid development of the field of behavioral law and economics, using findings from cognitive and social psychology, as well as experimental economics, to supplement the standard rational decision-maker perspective of traditional law and economics. Concurrent with this line of research has been a renewed focus on the place of the emotions in the legal system. Traditionally, discussions of emotions' role in the law have framed emotions as a counterpoint to rational thought: emotions have typically been viewed as a corruptive force that distorts logical reasoning. Under this view, arguably the prevailing view in American law, emotion is wholly distinct from cognition, and must be carefully cabined so that it does not bias or influence logic and rational reasoning. To some, the failure to do so undercuts essential principles of justice. When courts look to public opinion to gauge the constitutionality of, say, the death penalty, or when politicians look to the polls that allegedly reflect public opinion in deciding their policy stance, acknowledging such biases is of profound importance. Recognizing this potential difficulty is useful in designing and executing opinion surveys, as well as in interpreting such surveys' results. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)