This article offers a critique of Karsten Stueber's account of rule following as presented in his article "How to Think about Rules and Rule Following." The task Stueber sets himself is of defending the idea that human practices are bound and guided by rules (both causally and normatively) while avoiding the discredited "cognitive model of rule following." This article argues that Stueber's proposal is unconvincing because it falls foul of the very problems it sets out to avoid. Stueber's defense of rules as normative guides is shown to be either circular or burdened with an infinite regress, while his account of rules as causal determinants of our actions is shown to lapse back into the "cognitive model" that he explicitly rejects. © 2006 Sage Publications.
CITATION STYLE
Bernasconi-Kohn, L. (2006). How not to think about rules and rule following: A response to Stueber. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 36(1), 86–94. https://doi.org/10.1177/0048393105284228
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