A Possible Turning Point in Pakistan

Abstract

Unless the United States moves smartly, the killing of Mehsud is likely to have about the same implications for U.S.Pakistan relations as the U.S. raid on bin Laden's compound. As I learned during a research trip to Islamabad a week after bin Laden's death in May 2011, the Pakistani national debate moved astonishingly quickly from shock to humiliation to antiAmericanism. After that, a series of crises over the rest of 2011 took U.S.-Pakistan relations close to a full rupture. Now that Mehsud is gone, the United States' goal should be to drive a wedge between Islamabad and the Pakistani Taliban, deeper than the one between the United States and Pakistan, fudging by the shrill protests from Islamabad, this will not be easy. It is not, however, likely to be accomplished by waiting for the crisis to blow over. Instead, U.S. military and intelligence officers should approach their Pakistani counterparts with a plan to press their military advantage against the Taliban during its period of disarray. Although they may be rebuffed at first, Islamabad might soon reconsider if the Taliban directs its retaliatory fire against the Pakistani state, especially in [Nawaz Sharif]'s home base of Punjab, as it has in the past. Then, in once again recognizing the need to confront a common enemy, Washington and Islamabad may find themselves allies of convenience, if hardly friends, and that would mean scoring a far greater victory than Mehsud's death.