Android is a modern and popular software platform for smartphones. Among its predominant features is an advanced security model which is based on application-oriented mandatory access control and sandboxing. This allows developers and users to restrict the execution of an application to the privileges it has (mandatorily) assigned at installation time. The exploitation of vulnerabilities in program code is hence believed to be confined within the privilege boundaries of an application’s sandbox. However, in this paper we show that a privilege escalation attack is possible. We show that a genuine application exploited at runtime or a malicious application can escalate granted permissions. Our results immediately imply that Android’s security model cannot deal with a transitive permission usage attack and Android’s sandbox model fails as a last resort against malware and sophisticated runtime attacks.
Sven Bugiel, Lucas Davi, Alexandra Dmitrienko, Thomas Fischer, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi, Bhargava Shastry in ISOC Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (2012)Save reference 165 readers
Wenming Zhou, Yuqing Zhang, Xuefeng Liu in Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC conference on Computer & communications security - CCS '13 (2013)
Sven Bugiel, Lucas Davi, Alexandra Dmitrienko, Thomas Fischer, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi, Bhargava Shastry in Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security - CCS '11 (2011)
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