Updates on the security of FPGAs against power analysis attacks

Abstract

This paper reports on the security of cryptographic algorithms implemented on FPGAs against power analysis attacks. We first present some improved experiments against these reconfigurable devices, due to an improved measurement process. Although it is usually believed that FPGAs are noisy targets for such attacks, it is shown that simple power consumption models can nearly perfectly correlate with actual measurements. Then, we evaluate how these correlation values depend on the resources used in the FPGAs. Finally, we investigate the possibility to counteract these attacks by using random pre-charges in the devices and determine how this technique allows a designer to increase the security of an implementation. These results confirm that side-channel attacks present a serious threat for most microelectronic devices, including FPGAs. To conclude, we discuss the security vs. efficiency tradeoffs. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006.