Maintaining database anonymity in the presence of queries

Abstract

With the advent of cloud computing there is an increased interest in outsourcing an organization's data to a remote provider in order to reduce the costs associated with self-hosting. If that database contains information about individuals (such as medical information), it is increasingly important to also protect the privacy of the individuals contained in the database. Existing work in this area has focused on preventing the hosting provider from ascertaining individually identifiable sensitive data from the database, through database encryption or manipulating the data to provide privacy guarantees based on privacy models such as k-anonymity. Little work has been done to ensure that information contained in queries on the data, in conjunction with the data, does not result in a privacy violation. In this work we present a hash based method which provably allows the privacy constraint of an unencrypted database to be extended to the queries performed on the database. In addition, we identify a privacy limitation of such an approach, describe how it could be exploited using a known-query attack, and propose a counter-measure based on oblivious storage. © 2013 Springer-Verlag.