Network flow games model domains where a commodity can flow through a network controlled by selfish agents. Threshold Network Flow Games (TNFGs) are a form of such games where an agent coalition wins if it manages to send a flow exceeding a certain threshold between a source and a target vertex. Cooperative game theory predicts the agents' actions in such settings with solutions such as the core, the set of stable distributions of a coalition's gains among its members. However, some games have empty cores, so every distribution is inherently unstable. When the core is empty, one must use a more relaxed notion of stability, such as the least-core. We examine several problems regarding the least-core in general and restricted TNFGs. © 2011 Springer-Verlag GmbH.
CITATION STYLE
Bachrach, Y. (2011). The least-core of threshold network flow games. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 6907 LNCS, pp. 36–47). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-22993-0_7
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