Skip to main content
Journal ArticleOPEN ACCESS

Mixed equilibria in Tullock contests

Economic Theory (2015) 60(1) 59-71
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-014-0835-x
40Citations
Citations of this article
10Readers
Mendeley users who have this article in their library.

This article is free to access.

Abstract

Any symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium in a Tullock contest with intermediate values of the decisiveness parameter (“$$2

Author supplied keywords

References Powered by Scopus

The existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games, I: Theory

Review of Economic Studies
625Citations
N/AReaders
Get full text

POLITICALLY CONTESTABLE RENTS AND TRANSFERS

Economics & Politics
592Citations
N/AReaders
Get full text

The all-pay auction with complete information

Economic Theory
510Citations
N/AReaders
Get full text
View more at Scopus

Cited by Powered by Scopus

Crowdsourcing contests

European Journal of Operational Research
52Citations
N/AReaders
Get full text

Contest theory

Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization: Applications
40Citations
N/AReaders
Get full text

On the optimal design of biased contests

Theoretical Economics
31Citations
N/AReaders
Get full text
View more at Scopus

Register to see more suggestions

Mendeley helps you to discover research relevant for your work.

Already have an account?

Cite

CITATION STYLE

APA

Ewerhart, C. (2015). Mixed equilibria in Tullock contests. Economic Theory, 60(1), 59–71. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0835-x

Readers over time

‘17‘18‘19‘20‘21‘2400.751.52.253

Readers' Seniority

Tooltip

PhD / Post grad / Masters / Doc 6

67%

Professor / Associate Prof. 1

11%

Lecturer / Post doc 1

11%

Researcher 1

11%

Readers' Discipline

Tooltip

Economics, Econometrics and Finance 4

57%

Social Sciences 1

14%

Computer Science 1

14%

Mathematics 1

14%

Save time finding and organizing research with Mendeley

Sign up for free
0