Keynes, inflation and the public debt: How to Pay for the War as a policy prescription for financial repression?

Abstract

Recent contributions on 'financial repression' and 'money illusion' have referred to Maynard Keynes's How to Pay for the War as a supporting document. This article discusses whether Keynes prescribed policies of 'financial repression' that were implemented in the United Kingdom, and other countries, following World War II. It seems reasonable that Keynes's writings were instrumental in translating British monetary experiences of the 1920s and 1930s into expectations of policymakers during and after World War II, including a belief in 'money illusion' that suggested the use of inflation for driving down real interest rates of public bonds. If this was the case, How to Pay for the War could indeed provide an important explanation for the why and when of 'financial repression'. This article argues that How to Pay for the War only partly provided support for a policy of 'financial repression', and none for using inflation as a 'tax gatherer' to the detriment of domestic savers in general. Crediting Keynes as a source for widespread 'money illusion' is also out of line with the historical record.