I defend a threefold form of pluralism about chance, involving a tripartite distinction between propensities, probabilities, and frequencies. The argument has a negative and a positive part. Negatively, I argue against the identity thesis that informs current propensity theories, which already suggests the need for a tripartite distinction. Positively, I argue that that a tripartite distinction is implicit in much statistical practice. Finally, I apply a well-known framework in the modelling literature in order to characterize these three separate concepts functionally in terms of their roles in modelling practice.
CITATION STYLE
Suárez, M. (2017). Propensities, Probabilities, and Experimental Statistics. In European Studies in Philosophy of Science (Vol. 5, pp. 335–345). Springer Science and Business Media B.V. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-53730-6_27
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