One of the most widely used shared-key authentication schemes today is a challenge-response scheme. In this scheme, a function such as a message authentication code or a symmetric encryption scheme plays an important role. To ensure the security, we need to assume that these functions are included in a certain kind of functions family, e.g., a pseudorandom functions family. For example, functions such as SHA1-HMAC, DES and AES often assumed as the pseudorandom functions. But unfortunately, nobody knows that these functions are really pseudorandom functions and if not, then the security of the challenge-response scheme is not ensured any more. The common way to reduce this kind of fear is to construct the shared-key authentication scheme which can be proven secure with a weaker assumption on these functions. In this paper, we show that a blind-challenge-response shared-key authentication scheme which is a simple modified version of the original challenge-response authentication scheme can be constructed from a weaker cryptographic assumption known as weak pseudorandom functions.
CITATION STYLE
Nojima, R., Kobara, K., & Imai, H. (2006). Efficient shared-key authentication scheme from any weak pseudorandom function. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 4329 LNCS, pp. 303–316). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/11941378_22
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