On “Consequentialism” and the Capability Approach

Abstract

Amartya Sen defends the capability approach (CA) and the “discipline of consequential evaluation” which suggests that his CA is consistent with some form of “consequentialism”. Yet prominent commentators suggest or imply that Sen’s CA is not “consequentialist”. The resulting confusion is defused by showing that whether Sen’s CA, as a general normative perspective, is consistent with “consequentialism” depends on how “consequentialism” is understood. If “consequentialism” is understood as a moral doctrine, then the CA is not committed to either “consequentialism” or “non-consequentialism”. On a social choice theoretic (SCT) definition a normative framework or view is “consequentialist” if it restricts relevant information to “outcomes”. On this definition, whether the CA is compatible with “consequentialism” depends on whether “outcomes” are understood as “comprehensive” or “culmination” outcomes. Two varieties of “non-welfarist consequentialist” moral theory which restrict information respectively to capability and freedom are compared. Martha Nussbaum’s version of the CA is not a “non-welfarist consequentialist” theory of this sort because it is not a moral doctrine with a maximizing structure. It may, nonetheless, classify as “consequentialist” on the SCT definition if all valued objects in her approach can be included in the description of “outcomes”.